Machine Consciousness: What is it like to be a computer?

by Michael Davidson

(response to the article Machine Consciousness: Fact or Fiction?  by Igor Aleksander available at http://footnote1.com/machine-consciousness-fact-or-fiction )

The eminent AI researcher Igor Aleksander tackles the question as to whether a machine could be conscious in the above article posted in February 2014.

Aleksander assumes that being conscious is an advantage to an organism such as a human being.   Consciousness therefore has a function.

This is a step forward from some philosophical positions:

a)   consciousness has no function (epiphenomenalism – originating with Thomas Huxley in the 19th century [Huxley 1912] and espoused typically by some neuroscientists and psychologists today [Soon et al 2008; Wenger & Wheatley 1999]).

b)   “psychology must discard all reference to consciousness… [must] never use the terms consciousness, mental states, mind, content, introspectively verifiable, imagery and the like.” [psychological behaviourism – Watson 1913].

c)   any statement involving mind words (such as consciousness, intentions) can be paraphrased without any loss of meaning into a statement about what behaviour would result if the person considered happened to be in a certain situation. [philosophical behaviourism – Ryle 1949].

d)   consciousness does not exist [Eliminative Materialism eg Churchland 1981].

e)   the self does not exist [New Scientist 23 Feb 2013] see my response here.

Aleksander believes that consciousness can be understood in ‘scientific’ terms, though what he means by ‘scientific’ is not explained (that would require several thousand words on its own and is not a subject devoid of controversy itself).   I suspect when he says ‘scientific’ he means physicalist since the core – metaphysical – assumption of most AI is that all things can ultimately be explained through the theories of physics and computation.

It is Aleksander’s contention that it is not possible to know that people other than ourselves are conscious because we have no tests to tell us, we simply believe they are because they are human.  (Or is it that we only believe they are ‘human’?).  ‘Non-scientific’ ordinary humans simply believe things based upon assumptions.   He invites us to believe that ‘tests’ – by which I presume he means ‘scientific’ tests – could confer upon us some kind of certainty and proof.

This seems to miss the important point that scientific theories are built up from observations by humans.   A theory is not necessarily true; it is just the best idea we have which

1) explains the observations leading to some understanding
2) predicts new observations that can be tested and may be found to be true (it’s the observations that are true not necessarily the theory) and
3) enables us to (ultimately) control the phenomena in question.

The observations are repeatable by anyone who treads the same path of learning.  Thus we can build jumbo jets and hadron colliders.

Aleksander quotes from the report of a conference of neurologists, computer scientists and philosophers on machine consciousness (Swartz Foundation 2001): “We know of no fundamental law or principle operating in this universe that forbids the existence of subjective feelings in artefacts designed or evolved by humans.”   May be so, but we don’t know of any fundamental law that allows it either.   Nor do we know, if it be allowed, how consciousness manifests from the material of brains.   Metaphysics creeps easily into science at the fringes.

We have had several revolutions in science when theories that seemed to explain everything in their sphere of enquiry were found to be flawed.   The classic example is Newton’s ‘Laws’ which were held to be metaphysically ‘true’ for 250 years.   Newton’s Laws could not be ‘proved’ but we certainly believed them then – and we believe them now in the context for which they were formulated.   Newton’s metaphysical assumptions (absolute space and time ‘flowing’ evenly) and the metaphysical conclusions derived from his works (the ‘clockwork universe’) have been overturned.

The idea that humans are conscious can certainly be subject to qualitative tests. Apart from the obvious observations of whether a person is asleep or awake, we can see to some degree whether a person is alert and aware of his or her surroundings.   The theory that that person is conscious explains his or her bearing and demeanour, enables us to enter meaningful conversation, enables us to discuss what we simultaneously perceive or simultaneously imagine, cooperate in joint ventures and so on.   It is difficult to imagine how science could be conducted if ‘scientists’ were not conscious.

Evidently most people do not doubt their own consciousness and if there are indeed no means to determine whether other people are conscious it is only a small step from there to solipsism – the view that the world and other minds exist only in one’s own mind.  This is contrary to the physicalist position that only physical things exist.

Aleksander’s first step is to define consciousness (a notoriously difficult task).   You can exclude too much or include too much.  You can limit it to simply the difference between a person who is conscious and one who is unconscious, concentrating on anaesthetics and their antidotes.   Or you can broaden it to personal identity – the self – moral intuitions and even ‘cosmic consciousness’.   You can also divide the concept in various ways –

‘phenomenal consciousness’ (awareness of here and now) and social consciousness (which presupposes concepts, abstraction and language) [Guzeldere 1995 ]  or

‘core consciousness’ (awareness of here and now) and ‘extended consciousness’ (an elaborate sense of self) [Damasio 1999] or

‘access consciousness’ (the contents of the mind accessible to thought, speech and action)  and  phenomenal consciousness’ (what it is like to be me) [Bloch 1994]
(‘What it is like’, which I also allude to in my title, is a reference to the seminal article by Thomas Nagel “What is it like to be a bat?” [Nagel 1974])

Here is Aleksander’s definition:
consciousness is a “collection of mental states and capabilities that include:

1. a feeling of presence within an external world,
2. the ability to remember previous experiences accurately, or even imagine events that have not happened,
3. the ability to decide where to direct my focus,
4. knowledge of the options open to me in the future, and
5. the capacity to decide what actions to take.”

If a machine endowed with language could report similar sensations Aleksander reckons then we would have as much reason to assume that it is conscious as we have with another human being.   I suspect the five points are framed in this way as to allow the construction of an artefact that could be said to be ‘conscious’, thus satisfying the metaphysical first principle that humans are machines.

Aleksander has built a machine ‘VisAw’ which he claims satisfy points 1, 2 and 3.

The machine is a set of artificial neural networks with the inputs and outputs displayed on a computer screen.   There is a picture of the screen in the referenced article.

VisAw is based on the architecture of the part of the human brain called the extrastriate cortex – ie Brodmann areas 18, 19 and 37.   The cortex was studied microscopically by K Brodmann (1868-1916) in 1909 and various areas were found to have different structures now given numbers.   The various functions of the cortex are only loosely related to the Brodmann areas.   The parts of the cortex involved in vision are labeled V1, V2, V3, V4 and V5.   The striate cortex (V1 located in B17) is so named because it is striped or striated.

machine consciousness brain map
(The two hemispheres of the brain are similar)

Simplistically and briefly, V1 maps to the retina and detects edges; V2 ‘fills in’ illusory edges; V3 is concerned with motion; V4 is concerned with spatial frequency, shape and colour and is affected by attention; V5 is concerned with the perception of motion and the guiding of some eye movements (the ‘picture’ of our surroundings is built up from many snapshots from the central sensitive area of the retina).   (Damage to one or other of these areas of the brain results in a characteristic neurological disorder such as not being able to perceive motion).

VisAw models V3, V4 and V5 at least to some extent.

Let’s look at Aleksander’s points more closely:

1) a feeling of presence within an external world.

Applying this to humans, most people will certainly regard this as true for themselves, but Aleksander asks how do we know this for others?   One test is to ask them whether they feel they are in an external world.   A reasonable test you might think, but not one that is 100% reliable.   The following simple program can do this but few would consider the answer as reflecting the internal feeling.

INPUT x
IF x = “Do you feel you are present in an external world?” THEN
OUTPUT “of course”

You might think this example is too ridiculous for anyone to be taken in by it, but many simple conversational programs have done so (eg ELIZA [Weizenbaum 1976] fooled some people into revealing intimate secrets and some practicing psychiatrists believed that ELIZA could develop into an automatic form of psychotherapy).   It is only when the mechanism of how the program functions is revealed that the magic disappears.   Here’s an example:

Person: “My dog’s mother died recently.”
ELIZA: Tell me more about your mother
(it doesn’t recognise anything in the person’s statement apart from the word ‘mother’)

Aleksander contends that by suitable manipulation “the content of a machine’s ‘mind’ can be made transparent and observable, [so] attributing consciousness to it may be no more outlandish than attributing consciousness to a living creature.”   Obviously my little program would fail this test.   In the case of a neural network the workings are relatively obscure since they do not depend on rules written by a programmer but they are not necessarily any more magical.   The display of a message “I am imagining” does not presuppose any ‘I’ attached.   If we expose the workings of VisAw it is not clear that there are any feelings connected to it.   So it is difficult to see how we would know that the machine has any feeling at all.   Leibniz made the same point: “Perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions.   And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill.   That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.” (Liebniz 1714)

From what I can tell of VisAw it seems to ‘remember’ and ‘recognise’ two dimensional pictures of human faces.   Humans and other living creatures exist in three dimensions.   According to the psychologist JJ Gibson perception depends on the creature being able to move in the real world and so build up a three dimensional model of the world in which it is located and moves, rather than a world which rotates around the creature, as if on a TV screen.[Gibson 1986]

2. the ability to remember previous experiences accurately, or even imagine events that have not happened.

It could be argued that a DVD recorder has the ability to remember audio visual experiences but it seems unlikely that such a machine would be conscious.   Thus displaying the contents of VisAw’s memory does not illustrate consciousness.   Nor does the recombination of several parts of previous experiences demonstrate imagination, I would contend.   Imagination is creative not merely reconstructive.   A display on the computer screen saying “I am imagining” does not constitute imagining.

On the other hand humans don’t remember accurately anyway.   A robot that was similar cognitively to a human but with an ‘accurate memory’ would probably illustrate the phenomenon of the ‘uncanny valley’.   This refers to the revulsion humans typically experience when a robot is visually almost indistinguishable from a human being.   Such robots are experienced as distinctly ‘creepy’.

The criterion seems somewhat divorced from consciousness as such.   People with serious damage to the hippocampus (part of the brain associated with certain aspects of location and memory) typically cannot remember anything before a few minutes ago (though they can remember things before the injury occurred).   Such people can nevertheless learn skills such as playing the piano but cannot remember actually learning to do so, though they are definitely conscious according to the people who meet them.

3. the ability to decide where to direct my focus.

This seems to postulate ‘free will’ although most modern philosophers consider this to be an illusion and argue that all our actions are determined by prior causes.  This is the consequence of the predominance of the metaphysics of physicalism.   So I suppose that the machine must simply say that it has this ability for it to be considered that it has it (just like humans are supposed to).   The question of ‘free will’ is another thorny issue that requires several thousand words to summarise.

In so far as VisAw actually models the extrastriate cortex and produces something which seems to work in the way the cortex does, this is a big achievement.  But the extrastriate cortex is concerned with vision, and although vision is arguably a central part of consciousness (tell that to a blind man) it is not the whole of it.

Neuroscientists have not come out and claimed that the centre of consciousness is in the extrastriate cortex.   Some have identified the thalamus as the centre of consciousness, since most of the sensory nerves converge on it.   Others have suggested B40 is the seat of the sense of self; B24 the seat of free will; B9, B10, B11 and B12 the centre of the executive functions.   Others have said that consciousness is a function of the entire brain or even the whole body.

It is too much to require that tentative steps to what might become ‘machine consciousness’ should demonstrate the whole phenomenon immediately.   But I suspect that even a partial demonstration is a way off.

The Turing Test suggested by Alan Turing in 1950 was to test whether a computer and a human being could be distinguished if the medium was only a text message.   Turing estimated that a suitable program could be written in about 3000 man years by about the year 2000 and it would fool humans 70% of the time. [Turing 1950]   By contrast the program for the NASA space shuttle took about 22,000 man years to develop and I have not yet heard a claim that the shuttle is conscious.   Optimism is endemic in artificial intelligence research.

Arguably the program IDA [Franklin 2003] mentioned by Aleksander in his article has passed the Turing test in the very narrow domain of allocating sailors to new assignments by communicating in natural language by e-mail.    IDA does not understand the communications of the sailors in the same way a human would: it matches the content of the incoming e-mail to one of a few dozen templates eg “please find job“.   IDA would fail on general knowledge or anything outside its templates.   Yet it is claimed to be conscious by ‘machine consciousness’ advocates.

As a tougher test for machine consciousness I propose the ‘Reid Test’.   The Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Thomas Reid (1710-1796) defined common sense as “that degree of judgment which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business.” (Reid 1785).   Consciousness and common sense are not quite the same concept but I believe consciousness is a prerequisite for common sense.  Anything that demonstrates common sense must be conscious, I think. I contend that consciousness requires the abilities to perceive (external objects in 3 dimensions and one’s location in the world), understand (words and abstract concepts), imagine (conceive novel situations), communicate (in some natural language) and act on the environment.   Consciousness without emotion would seem paradoxical (the uncanny valley) for emotion reveals the degree of involvement of the subject with the object.   Clearly the scope of these abilities would be limited in the initial stages of development of any conscious machine.   In addition the machine must be open to internal inspection so that any ‘magic’ is exposed.   History shows that humans can be deceived by determined trickery.

Animals other than humans show abilities in these domains to the point where we believe them to be conscious.   For example dogs can remember the layout of their environment, understand a limited number of commands and the task at hand, imagine certain situations and behaviours (think sheep dogs), and bark and whine in appropriate places.   They obviously display emotions.   The behaviour of trained chimps and orang-utans with sign language is even more impressive.   What we don’t have are scales of achievement in these domains that would allow us to measure the degree of consciousness.   It seems to be an all-or-nothing attribute that is confused with and by other attributes such as intelligence, social context and trained response on the part of the animal, and by empathy on our part.   Consciousness itself must be subject to more investigation before we can definitively ascribe consciousness to lower animals such as bees.

Developing a conscious machine requires a lot of effort in physics, computer science, psychology, neuroscience, philosophy and so on. It also requires a notable lack of arrogance not merely assertions. It also requires good luck in finding that metaphysical reality actually allows machine consciousness.

So to answer Aleksander’s query: Is Machine Consciousness  fact or fiction?
For the moment and the forseeable future: fiction.   But keep trying.

 References

Block N (1994) Consciousness in A companion to Philosophy of Mind ed S Guttenplan, Blackwell

Churchland PM  (1981) Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes Journal of philosophy vol 78 no 2 section 1

Damasio A (1999) The Feeling of what happens Heinemann p16

Franklin S (2003) IDA: A conscious artifact? Journal of Consciousness Studies  vol 10 no 4-5 p47-66

Gibson JJ (1986) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception Lawrence Erlbaum Associates

Guzeldere G ( 1995) Problems of Consciousness: a perspective on contemporary issues, current debates Journal Of Consciousness Studies vol2 no 2 p118

Huxley T  (1912) Method and Results Macmillan : p240, p243 available at http://www.archive.org/details/methodresultsess00huxluoft

Leibniz G  (1714) Monadologie sec 17 transl R Latta available at http://philosophy.eserver.org/leibniz-monadology.txt

Nagel T (1974) What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review vol 83, 4 p435 available at http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/Nagel_Bat.html

Reid T  (1785) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay 6 Chapter 2  (p229)  available at http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/reid1785essay6_1.pdf

Ryle G (1949,2000) The Concept of Mind Penguin

Soon CS, Brass M, Heinze H-J & Haynes J-D  (2008) Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience  11, p543 – 545

Swartz Foundation (2001) Can a Machine be Conscious? available at http://www.theswartzfoundation.org/banbury_e.asp

Turing A (1950) Computing Machinery and Intelligence Mind 59  (236) p433-460  available http://www.loebner.net/Prizef/TuringArticle.html

Watson JB  (1913) Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it. Psychological Review, vol 20, p158-177 available at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Watson/views.htm

Wegner D & Wheatley T (1999) Apparent Mental Causation Source of the Experience of Will American Psychologist vol 54 no 7 p480-492 available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~wegner/pdfs/Wegner&Wheatley1999.pdf

Weizenbaum J  (1976) Computer Power and Human Reason Penguin p188

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Memories of Historical Sexual Abuse

by Michael Davidson

A number of allegations of historical sexual abuse have recently hit the courts in the UK. This follows revelations of sexual abuse on the part of the celebrity DJ Jimmy Savile who died in 2011. Following his death there were 450 complaints against Savile including 34 rapes and 28 sexual assaults on children under 10 years of age at the time, some offences dating back to the 1950’s. Savile was associated with numerous charities and good causes during his lifetime, all of which are now embarrassed by their association with him.

The publicity surrounding this scandal has encouraged people to come forward with allegations concerning sexual misconduct by other celebrities and non-celebrities many years ago, some of which are now proceeding through the courts with attendant publicity. I do not envy the jurors their task of deciding on the guilt or innocence of the defendants in these cases. The defence is often that the alleged perpetrator was not in the stated place at the stated time, or had never met the alleged victim, or the sexual relations were consensual, so it boils down to one person’s word against another’s. Clearly, rape and sexual assault where proved should be punished according to the law. But imagine for the moment that you are suddenly confronted by a policeman who states that an allegation, or worse several allegations, of sexual assault perpetrated perhaps decades ago have been made against you. How to defend yourself? Unless you kept a detailed diary which says where you were and who you were with at the time in question, and can then call on witnesses or other documentation, you are in a sticky situation. You can easily start to doubt your own memory.

The key questions are “How reliable is memory?” and “How can memories be assessed for truth?”

Even if we were able to report precisely what we see, our accounts of what occurred some time ago rely on our memories that can be subject to error in many ways. Psychologist Daniel Schacter (Ref 1) has listed seven sins that our memories are subject to:

  • 1) transience
    forgetting things gradually over time
  • 2) absentmindedness
    forgetting because of not paying attention to things that we should have
  • 3) blocking
    The temporary inability to remember something that is known when you need it (it may pop into consciousness some time later)
  • 4) misattribution
    assigning a memory to the wrong source, such as attributing someone’s statements to another
  • 5) suggestibility
    developing false memories for events that did not happen
  • 6) bias
    changing past events in support of current attitudes and beliefs
  • 7) persistence
    remembering past episodes that we would prefer to forget.

The phenomenon of false memory is regarded as particularly problematical for any notion of objective reporting (Hall, McFeaters & Loftus Ref 2).   In a well known experiment into the reliability of eye witness testimony (Loftus & Palmer Ref 3) 45 students were each shown seven short film clips of car accidents. The students were asked to describe the accident they had just seen and then answer a number of questions. The 45 students were divided into 5 groups who answered a slightly different set of questions. The key difference was the question: “About how fast were the cars going when they xxx into each other?” where xxx was substituted by one of the verbs “smashed”, “collided”, “bumped”, “hit “, and “contacted “. When the word “smashed ” was used the mean estimated speed was 41mph and when “contacted ” the mean estimated speed was 32mph, with the other verbs somewhere in between (“hit” was 34mph). This result could be due to distortion of memory by the verb used, or it could be caused by distorted report based on what the student thinks is the expected answer.

In a follow-up experiment 150 students were shown a short film with a 4 second multiple car accident. The students were divided into 3 groups and asked several questions, one of which was asked the ‘smashed’ question and another, the ‘hit’ question. The third was not queried about the speed. A week later all 150 students were asked a number of other questions including the critical question: “Did you see any broken glass?” (there was none in the film). Here is the result:

  • Broken Glass seen
    smashed: 16 (55%); hit: 7; control: 6.
  • Broken Glass not seen
    smashed: 34 (28%); hit: 43; control: 44.

Considering the fact that the difference in response appears to have occurred because of one word in one question among several asked one week earlier (p < 1%), this calls for some explanation. The ‘reconstructive hypothesis’ is that two types of information go to make up a memory of an event. One is the information obtained from the perception of the event and another is the information supplied after the event (in this case the suggestion of ‘hit’ or ‘smashed’). These may become integrated as one memory. When the question about broken glass is asked, the subject who thought he saw a smash rather than a mere hit, reasons that there must have been glass and adds it to the memory.

The phenomenon that memory can be changed after the fact is not confined to episodic memory. There is evidence that the brain converts short term memory into long-term memory by a hypothetical process known as ‘memory consolidation’. Experiments with conditioning in different animals as divergent as bees, snails and rats show that consolidated memories are not fixed for all time, but can become malleable when they are reactivated. This is known as ‘reconsolidation’ and it only occurs in a ‘window’ of time after the reactivation of the memory.

The Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) developed the idea of ‘conditioning’ around 1900.   This was mainly through his work with the salivary response of dogs to food.   As a physiologist Pavlov was interested in the chemistry of digestion and was collecting saliva from dogs when they were presented with food.   The salivation response is automatic and not learned.    When he rang a bell just before giving the dog food a few times he found the bell on its own would cause the saliva to flow.   Pavlov called the stimulus that caused the physiological response on its own (the presentation of food) ‘the unconditional stimulus’.   This was because it always gave rise to ‘the unconditional response’ or ‘the unconditional reflex’ (saliva).   The ‘conditional stimulus’ was the originally neutral stimulus (bell) which through enough pairings with the ‘unconditional stimulus’ (food) would display the same response (the ‘conditional response’ – saliva).   In other words, the animal had learnt a connection between the two stimuli and it responded in the same way to either of the two.   Pavlovian conditioning of a fear response gradually diminishes when the conditional stimulus is not associated with the unconditional stimulus (a process known as ‘deconditioning’), but the fear response is liable to return later (so-called ‘spontaneous recovery’).

An experiment to investigate the reconsolidation window in humans was performed in 2009 in which the unconditional stimulus was an electric shock and the conditional stimulus an image of a coloured square. The ‘fear’ stimulated by the coloured square was measured by the change in the electrical resistance of the palms. The experiment found that if the deconditioning is performed inside the reconsolidation window (say 10 minutes after a ‘reminder’ conditional stimulus) there does not appear to be spontaneous recovery even a year later. On the other hand where the deconditioning occurred outside the reconsolidation window (say 6 hours later) spontaneous recovery occurred the following day and a year later (Schiller et al Ref 4).   It might be thought that the deconditioning process would itself establish a reconsolidation window, but this does not appear to be the case. The conclusion is that the original fear memory has been changed.

In later experiments, Elizabeth Loftus attempted to create completely false memories in 24 individuals aged 18 to 53. The subjects were given a booklet containing three one-paragraph accounts of events in their childhood as recounted by a parent or older sibling. Into the booklet was inserted a plausible but false event that the subject had been lost in a shopping mall for an extended period and had been comforted by an elderly woman before finally being reunited with the family. The subjects were asked what they remembered about each event. About two thirds of the factual events were recalled immediately on reading the accounts and a quarter of the subjects partially or fully ‘remembered’ the false event (p < 1%). “Statistically, there were some differences between the true memories and the false ones: participants used more words to describe true memories and they rated the true memories as somewhat more clear. But if an onlooker were to observe many of our participants describe an event, it would be difficult indeed to tell whether the account was a true or false memory.” (Loftus Ref 5)
As far as I know no attempt has been made to establish any personality or character differences between the people who did not ‘get lost in the mall’ and those who did. The former outnumber the latter by a factor of 3 to 1. Personality may be a factor but it seems that the more trusted the source of the false information the more likely that a false memory is implanted. For instance, a contrived photograph of a childhood flight in a hot-air balloon gave rise to a false memory of such an event in 50% of 20 subjects aged 18 to 28 (Wade et al Ref 6).

In the last decade there have been several attempts to distinguish true memories from false ones, using EEG, PET and MRI but although group differences have been found there is no reason yet to modify Loftus’ 1997 conclusion: “Without corroboration, there is little that can be done to help even the most experienced evaluator to differentiate true memories from ones that were suggestively planted.”

There is every reason to be cautious about first person reports, particularly with reports of satanic and sexual abuse ‘just remembered’, but if it were possible to dispense with memory all together, much more is at risk than mere reminiscence. Indeed, science itself would collapse.

There are some memories that are particularly vivid – a so called ‘flash bulb memory’. This is where particularly surprising and emotional events are apparently etched into our memories, such as when you first heard that John F Kennedy was assassinated (if you are that old); Princess Diana had died; the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York had collapsed and so on. These mentioned ones are of international importance but such memories are not necessarily so e.g. a rape or when you heard of the death of a close relative for instance. But are these memories as accurate and as detailed as we think?

I remember being in a cinema watching a Japanese film ‘Close to Life’ by the Japanese director Kurasawa when the lights went up and the cinema manager came in to say that Kennedy had been assassinated. I only know the name of the film now because I identified it from the plot some years later. I remember that one of my two friends there with me immediately left. I do remember their names. The lights went down and the film continued. I can see the manager now, but not in any photographic detail. I could not say at what point in the film the interruption came, nor what I or my friends were wearing at the time. In my mental image picture there is nothing much to distinguish this cinema from any other though I have the impression of a number of rows with a certain width in front and behind me, but I could not count them. Although I knew the cinema manager at the time I do not remember his name nor could I say with any certainty what he was wearing. Such memories do not appear to be as accurate as we think they are.

Psychologists Neisser and Harsch (Ref 7) interviewed 106 college students less than 24 hours after the Challenger disaster and then again after 2½ years. The later recollections were much less detailed than the original. Neisser thinks that the persistence of the memories and their clarity is due to the frequent consideration the memories receive after the event, rather than to the original impact. The flash bulb events are the link between our own personal life stories and the life stories of our friends and acquaintances; or as Neisser puts it, “with ‘history'”. Flash bulb memories are prone to confusions and omissions and insertion of people who were not there.

People who survive traumatic events sometimes develop the condition known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Sometimes the condition arises a considerable time after the traumatic event. PTSD entails such things as disturbing and recurring flashbacks, avoidance of reminders of the event, and high levels of anxiety. Surely these kinds of memory are more reliable? In a 1990’s study 59 Gulf War veterans were asked about their war experiences a month after return and again 2 years later. (Southwick et al Ref 8) 70% recalled at least one traumatic event after 2 years that they had not mentioned before. This does not necessarily mean they were confabulated, but those recounting the most ‘new’ memories also reported the most PTSD symptoms. This suggests to some that the vets were attributing symptoms of depression and anxiety to a memory given new significance or even unconsciously fabricated.

Victims of rape and other traumas are often offered psychotherapy (ie counselling and talking cures). There are somewhere between 400 and 800 different brands of ‘psychotherapy’ depending to which list you refer, and some are of a bizarre nature and dubious efficacy. That there are so many versions is testimony to the lack of good theory based on evidence. Some of these have extensive training periods and/or accreditation procedures and/or are backed by some academic background and/or are government sanctioned and/or are heavily promoted. However, the sometime recommendation that psychotherapies be licensed and validated by the government has little going for it. In view of the wide definition of psychotherapy [HH Strupp defines psychotherapy as “the systematic use of a human relationship to effect enduring changes in a person’s cognition, feelings and behaviour.” (Ref 9) ] it is difficult to separate ‘psychotherapy’ from those social interactions which the government currently has, and should have, no business in. See Dawes (Ref 10) for the American experience with licensing of psychologists from the point of view of a professor of psychology. The usual rationale for such licensing is that the public should be protected from charlatans, and quality assurance of the techniques. According to Dawes, licensing is more oriented to protecting the status and income of practitioners and does little to protect the public, rather it sanctions the practice of dubious procedures such as alien abduction ‘therapy’, the application of invalid diagnostic tests such as the Rorschach and the public recognition of being an ‘expert witness’ in court.

Psychoanalytically-oriented therapists think that the reason an incident apparently causing PTSD was not a problem for a period of time was because the individual repressed the memory (pushed it into his or her ‘unconscious mind’) and was unable to recall it. The repression is expressed in unhealthy emotions and behaviour. When the memory is recovered the individual is restored to ‘health’. This idea gave rise to ‘recovered memory therapy’ in which therapists sought to uncover repressed memories of traumas of all kinds. Memories of ‘sexual abuse’, ‘satanic rites’, ‘ritual murders’ not to mention ‘alien abductions’ were recovered in the 1980’s and 1990’s which owed more to the imagination of the therapists than the experiences of the individuals. A number of high-profile court cases where fathers were wrongfully imprisoned for sexual abuse of their daughters based on memories ‘recovered’ by hypnosis and suggestion, tempered the courts with caution at least for a while, if not the therapists.

Furthermore those who were subjected to therapy of this kind were evidently more upset afterwards than they were before and the therapists may well have actually created the PTSD they were trying to prevent. See (McNally Ref 11) for some accounts of these false memory cases. One of the more interesting (for outsiders) was the case of a man whose daughters recovered ‘memories’ of him having abused them. In an “intensive quasi-hypnotic interrogation” of this man he recovered memories of having raped his own children repeatedly, having led a satanic cult for nearly 20 years and been involved in the sacrificial murder of hundreds of babies. He confessed to the crimes and was jailed despite there being no evidence of missing babies or bodies or a satanic cult. Evidently patients who recover memories of ritual abuse often develop PTSD during the course of therapy – rates have ranged from 28% to 100%. Survivors of ‘recovered memory therapy’ seem to be intent on revenge against their alleged abusers. The problem with ‘recovered memory therapy’ was that the ‘memories’ were false.

It is not just ‘psychotherapists’ who can instil false memories. Leading questions by social workers, and police can contaminate and corrupt children’s (and adult’s) memories. This evidently occurred in the notorious cases of sexual abuse ‘epidemics’ in Scotland in 1991 (BBC News Ref 12) and in England in 1987 (Pragnell Ref 13)
Not all psychological investigation of memory is negative in the sense that it throws doubt on the validity of memory. But care has to be taken not to make inadvertent suggestions. Based on the challenges mentioned above, Geiselman and Fisher (Ref 14), developed a means of improving the validity of recall, for example in forensic investigations, called the ‘cognitive interview’. This technique is based on the idea that a memory consists of many different elements and that the more context that can be recalled or reinstated the more reliable the recall is likely to be. (Evidently, this is the factual basis of the old Hollywood joke in which a person can only recall certain information when he is drunk. One experiment with deep-sea divers asked them to recall a list of words given to them either under water or on land. This showed that words given underwater were best recalled under water and words given on land were best recalled on land.) Secondly, memory can be retrieved in several ways, so what is not retrieved by one means may be retrieved in another. The technique includes four instructions that interviewers could use to get more reliable accounts from witnesses:

  • (1) try to picture in your mind the circumstances that surrounded the crime event including what the environment looked like, and also think about your feelings and reactions to the event.
  • (2) Report everything that you can remember; do not leave anything out of your description, even things you may consider unimportant.
  • (3) Report the events in different orders: forward, backward, or starting from the middle.
  • (4) Try to recall the different perspectives you may have had during the event or think about what some other prominent person at the event would have seen.

In addition to these general instructions, the cognitive interview also contains specific prompts to facilitate recall of particular kinds of information… (eg ‘Did he remind you of anyone you know? If so, why?’… ‘Was there anything unusual about the voice? What were your reactions to what was said?’)”. Evidently in laboratory experiments this technique produced 25%-30% more facts than standard interviews without increasing the number of false details and it may decrease the contaminating effect of misleading post-event information. Field studies with police interviewers trained in the technique showed a 47% increase in information gleaned.

Now that police interviews are routinely videoed and the videos shown to the jury, the jury should be able to assess to what degree the interrogation was in line with the cognitive interview technique. Unfortunately juries can only judge cases on the evidence before them and unless evidence such as that discussed here is presented to them the average juror will be ignorant of it.

It is not sufficient to accept an allegation of rape or sexual abuse without obtaining such information as time and place, details of how the offence was perpetrated in all the embarrassing details, the size and shape of the offender’s member, and so on. Is the account consistent from telling to telling or does it show evidence of successive ‘embroidery’?

The difficulty of assessing the truth of a ‘recalled event’ by witnesses has given rise to the idea that lies can be detected by physiological measurements as used in the ‘lie detector’ or ‘polygraph’. The theory behind the polygraph is that a deceptive answer to a pertinent question causes an emotional response such as fear of detection or heightened arousal which shows up in the physiological recordings. Although the result of a polygraph test appears to be a purely physiological measurement, in fact the result is a product of the examinee’s motivation, the interrogation technique and the interpretation of the physiological measurements, as well as the physiological effects themselves [Orne et al Ref 15].   Accordingly polygraph operators generally demonstrate to the subject how the polygraph can detect emotional responses and instil a belief that the polygraph can detect lies. Faced with an infallible witness such as this many interviewees confess, believing resistance is useless. On the other hand accused persons sometimes volunteer for polygraph tests believing their innocence can be proved by their physiological responses. Physiological responses to the various questions can vary according to whether the examiner is friendly or aggressive, and whether the examiner is acting for the prosecution or the defence. Sometimes the examiner concludes that the subject is deceptive because of suspected “counter-measures” during the session. The subject’s psychological profile such as his attitude to lying or his considerations concerning the alleged offences must be pertinent. The result of a polygraph examination thus depends on a number of factors apart from the actual physiological responses. Results are therefore difficult to replicate. Scientific opinion on the accuracy of the polygraph in detecting lies is generally unenthusiastic [Fienberg et al Ref 16]. There is no direct causative chain that leads from lying to the physiological responses. The physiological responses can be caused by other factors than lying and it is therefore impossible to decide on the basis of the physiological response that a lie has occurred.

In most cases there is no independent measure of deception therefore the incidence of false positives and false negatives cannot be ascertained. In one experiment a number of students were given information on a forthcoming test. When wired up to what they believed were lie-detectors that were in fact dummies, 13 out of 20 confessed to receiving the information, whereas only 1 in 20 confessed when not wired up[Quigley-Fernandez & Tedeschi Ref 17]. Therefore even spectacular true positives do not prove the effectiveness of polygraph testing per se. Also, false confessions do occur [Meyer & Youngjohn Ref 18].  A confession by a naïve subject is no doubt counted as a success for the polygraph, but this success does not automatically carry over into the case where a more sophisticated and possibly trained subject deliberately wants to evade detection. Polygraph evidence is not admissible in UK criminal courts.

The perceived infallibility of technology is carried over even more convincingly into brain scanning techniques, so-called ‘brain fingerprinting’. In this technique the subject is hooked up to an EEG (electroencephalograph) that records electrical potentials in the scalp. The particular potential that is considered significant is a positive potential that occurs roughly 300 milliseconds after a stimulus that the subject recognises. This P300 potential is thought to occur where the subject recognises the stimulus as familiar or meaningful, but not otherwise. Thus a number of pictures, phrases or words, including some relevant to the enquiry, are shown to the subject and the P300 potential looked for. Thus when a P300 response occurs on a picture of (say) the murder weapon when the subject would otherwise have no knowledge that this was the case, this could be taken by a jury as an indication of guilt. But brain fingerprinting only reveals what information is stored in the subject’s brain. It does not show how or why the information got there [Farwell Ref 19]. Therefore the selection of the various phrases and pictures is critical. The degree to which such memory traces are reliably indicated under the conditions where memory is subject to the seven sins mentioned above requires investigation. According to Farwell, no questions are asked or statements made during the test, so it is not in any sense detecting ‘lies’. In the case of an alleged rape, the intent of the parties, which may be the vital piece of evidence, is not revealed. Brain fingerprinting has therefore limitations, and is only one more piece of evidence to be weighed by the jury, if indeed such evidence is produced and admissible. The method of producing such evidence must also be subject to scrutiny to prevent abuse and even ‘fitting up’. In addition the reliability of brain fingerprinting has been seriously questioned [Rosenfeld Ref 20].

As far as I know no brain fingerprinting evidence has been produced in a British court and is not likely to do so in the near future. There are also ethical considerations in the use of such techniques, for example: does an individual have a right to their own thoughts? Under what circumstances should such a right be waived? What level of certainty is required for a person’s statement is to be classified as a lie based on the output of a machine?

At this time of writing a prominent case of alleged rapes and sexual assaults by a celebrity has been resolved with a ‘not guilty’ verdict. There was a high cost to the tax payer of this and other trials, not to mention the stress to the accused, the witnesses and their families. The onus is therefore on the Crown Prosecution Service to make sure there is a reasonable chance of conviction. It should never be the case that every prosecution brought by the CPS should result in a guilty verdict. However it is up to the CPS to vet the police evidence and assess the reliability of witnesses. There are standard psychological techniques to measure to what degree a witness is suggestible or indeed fantasy prone [Gudjonnson Ref 21]. The main use of this kind of evidence in court has been in assessing whether a confession by a defendant was the result of suggestion and coercion. Such evidence has resulted in the reversal of ‘guilty’ verdicts in several high-profile cases. It would be too much to suggest that all witnesses be subjected to such tests, but in the case of historical abuse cases with little or no evidence beyond the witness testimony, the CPS should consider using the tests to assess the reliability of witnesses. If the main prosecution witness proves reliable when subject to such tests, the CPS would strengthen their case. In the contrary eventuality, the CPS would save a great deal of tax payers’ money and not lose face by bringing a weak case.

What do you think?

 

 

References

[Ref 1] Schacter D L (1999) The seven sins of memory: Insights from psychology and cognitive neuroscience American Psychologist vol 54 p182-203
[Ref 2] Hall DF, McFeaters SJ & Loftus EF (1987) Alterations in Recollection of Unusual and Unexpected Events Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol 1 (1) p3-10 available at http://www.scientificexploration.org/journal/jse_01_1_hall.pdf
[Ref 3] Loftus EF & Palmer JC (1974) Reconstruction of automobile destruction: An example of the interaction between language and memory Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour vol 13 p585-589
[Ref 4] Schiller D, Monfils M-H, Raio C, Johnson DC, LeDoux JE & Phelps EA (2010) Preventing the return of fear in humans using reconsolidation update mechanisms. Nature vol 463 (8637) p49-53
[Ref 5] Loftus EF (1997) Creating False Memories Scientific American vol 277 no 3 p70-75 available at http://faculty.washington.edu/eloftus/articles/sciam.htm
[Ref 6] Wade KA, Garry M, Read JD & Lindsay DS (2002) A picture is worth a thousand lies. PsychonomicBulletin and Review vol 9 p597–603 available at http://web.uvic.ca/psyc/lindsay/publications/2002WadGarReadLind.pdf
[Ref 7] Neisser U & Harsch N (1992) Phantom Flashbulbs: false recollections of hearing the news about Challenger in Winograd E & Neisser U (eds) Affect and Accuracy in Recall: studies in Flashbulb memories Cambridge p9-31
[Ref 8] Southwick SM, Morgan CA, Nicolaou AL & Charney DS (1997) Consistency of memory for combat related traumatic events in veterans of Operation Desert Storm American Journal of Psychiatry vol 154 p173-177 abstract available at  http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/doi/abs/10.1176/ajp.154.2.173
[Ref 9] Strupp HH (1986) The non-specific hypothesis of therapeutic effectiveness: a current assessment American Journal of Orthopsychiatry vol 56 (4) p513-520
[Ref 10] Dawes, RM (1994) House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth New York: The Free Press p133-177
[Ref 11] McNally RJ (2003) Remembering Trauma Belknap Press chapter 8 p240-246
[Ref 12] BBC News (1991) “1991: Orkney ‘abuse’ children go home”. On This Day 4 April 1991. available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/4/newsid_2521000/2521067.stm
[Ref 13] Pragnell C (2002) The Cleveland Child Sexual Abuse Scandal: An Abuse and Misuse of Professional Power available at http://www.davidlane.org/children/choct2002/choct2002/pragnell%20cleveland%20abuse.html
[Ref 14] Geiselman RE & Fisher RP (1988) The Cognitive Interview: An Innovative Technique for questioning witness of crime Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology vol 4 (2) p2-5
[Ref 15] Orne MT, Thakray RI & Paskewitz DA (1972) On the detection of deception: A model for the study of physiological effects of psychological stimuli in Greenfield NS & Sternbach RA (eds) Handbook of Psychophysiology New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston
[Ref 16] Fienberg SE, Blascovich JJ, Cacioppo JT, Davidson RJ, Ekman P, Faigman DL, Grambsch PL, Imrey PB, Keeler EB, Laskey KB, McCutchen SR, Murphy KR, Raichle ME, Shiffrin RM, Slavkovic A & Stern PC (2003) The Polygraph and Lie detection National Academies Press p288
[Ref 17] Quigley-Fernandez B and Tedeschi JT (1978) The bogus pipeline as lie detector: Two validity studies Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36 p247-256
[Ref 18] Meyer RG & Youngjohn JB (1991) Effects of feedback and validity expectancy on responses in a lie detector interview Forensic Reports 4 p235-244
[Ref 19] Farwell LA (2004) PBS Innovation Series – Brain Fingerprinting: Ask the Experts available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/innovation/experts_qa8.html
[Ref 20] Rosenfeld JP (2005) Brain Fingerprinting: A Critical Analysis The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice vol 4 no 1
[Ref 21] Gudjonsson GH (1984) Interrogative Suggestibility: Comparison between ‘False Confessors’ and ‘Deniers’ in Criminal Trials. Med Science Law vol 24 no 1 p56-60 available at http://www.roughjusticetv.co.uk/suggestion.pdf

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Common Sense and Reid’s Razor

by Michael Davidson

One of the problems in philosophy is how to set standards by which philosophical theories might be evaluated. Various philosophers have proposed razors, ie philosophical principles that can be used to cut away and discard other philosophical principles and ideas. Perhaps the best known are Ockham’s Razor and Hume’s Fork. Another razor is ‘common sense’. This term has unfortunately become a pejorative in some philosophical and ‘scientific’ circles along with ‘folk psychology’ which means explanations of the behaviour of people in terms of their beliefs and goals, rather than in ‘scientific’ terms such as neurophysiology. One objection to the term ‘common sense’ is that though everyone presumes to have it, it seems to be remarkably absent in others, and it lacks any agreed definition.

Another objection is that our best physics (ie quantum mechanics and relativity) “defies common sense” and since this physics describes how the world is, common sense can and should be discarded as inconsistent with reality. The astrophysicist John Barrow, for example, defines common sense as

“a description that crystallises from what is already known, and implies a certain unwillingness to admit any change, …the implication being that any deviation from it would be uncommonly senseless”.(Barrow 1988)

Similarly the biologist Lewis Wolpert contends

“that ‘natural’ thinking – ordinary day-to-day common sense – will never give an understanding about the nature of science. Scientific ideas are with rare exceptions counter-intuitive: they cannot be acquired by simple inspection of phenomena and are often outside everyday experience. Secondly, doing science requires a conscious awareness of the pitfalls of ‘natural’ thinking. For common sense is prone to error when applied to problems requiring rigorous and quantitative thinking; lay theories are highly unreliable.
. . .I would almost contend that if something fits in with common sense it almost certainly isn’t science. The reason is that the way in which the universe works is not the way in which common sense works.
. . . common sense thinking is quite unsatisfactory [for science]. It is quite different from scientific thinking lacking the necessary rigour consistency and objectivity.
. . . One of the strongest arguments for the distance between common sense and science is that the whole of science is totally irrelevant to most people’s day to day lives.” (Wolpert 1992)

This view seems to promote the alienation of science from the rest of human activity. If science is antithetical to ‘common sense’ it does not follow that because something is contrary to ‘common sense’ it must be true. In another part of the book, Wolpert states that he is ‘a common-sense realist’ ie “I believe there is an external world which I share with others and which can be studied.” but holds that his philosophical position is irrelevant to his scientific activities.

In both these examples ‘common sense’ seems to mean the frequent notions that people have about the world particularly in those areas in which they have little or no experience. Appeals to common sense certainly ought to be more careful and more specific about what particular principle is held to be ‘sensible’ and ‘common’. But neither ‘frequent beliefs’ nor ‘common sense’ are a single principle.

The foremost ‘common sense’ philosopher was probably the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid (1710 – 1796). Reid acknowledged Francis Bacon and John Locke as his predecessors. Reid’s standing as a philosopher diminished at the hands of Kant who was dismissive of common sense as

“but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and confides in it.” (Kant 1783)

The most well-known ‘common sense philosopher’ of the twentieth century was G E Moore (1873-1958), through his defence of common sense in an essay.(Moore 1925) Karl Popper also claimed that his philosophical theories did not clash with common sense nor with science (Popper 1983). Commitment to ‘common sense’ is of course no guarantee of having it.

Defining what we mean by common sense is not easy. Generally we define it by those things which are not it, for example when someone does something we consider stupid. If we look up the two words in the dictionary we find:

common: shared (as in ‘common property’); open or free to all (as in ‘common land’); frequent (as in ‘a common event’); inferior (as in ‘a common dwelling’).
sense: sensation (as in ‘sense of pain’); understanding (as in ‘it makes sense’); sound reasoning and judgement (as in ‘to speak sense’); opinion or sentiment (as in ‘the sense of the meeting’).

With four possible meanings each of ‘common’ and ‘sense’, (plus some minor meanings) we have plenty of room for misunderstanding and misrepresentation. The form of common sense that is usually dismissed as useless is ‘frequent opinions’ or ‘frequent notions’. Many frequent notions are false and misleading. That is no news. A different reading of the term ‘common sense’ is “the power of reasoning and judgement possessed by people in general and open and free to all.” Very often when this power is brought to bear on frequent notions they are seen to be the falsehoods they are. What is missing from frequent false notions is exactly this power. Obviously I do not mean to say that all mankind are capable of discourse on quantum mechanics; but I do mean to say that most people given the inclination, aptitude and application would be able to appreciate the subject. The sciences are built on this power presumed to exist for all. Not everyone can be an Einstein and trail blaze, but we assume that everyone with an inclination can follow. In the sciences, at least, there are no private lines to God.

‘Common sense’ is for reasons mentioned an unfortunate term. A possible alternative term is ‘good sense’ which perhaps escapes the connotation of “everybody knows (that which turns out not to be so)”, and perhaps sees the term more as an epistemological one than a metaphysical one. It is difficult to see how any principle can stand once we throw out good sense as a starting point.

Reid defined common sense as “that degree of judgement which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business” (Reid 1785a) I have no quarrel with this definition. To try to avoid the unfortunate connotations of the term ‘common sense’ I refer to this as ‘Reid’s Razor’. Take a philosophical or scientific principle that is being applied to a particular situation: ask yourself whether you would be able to converse rationally and transact business with that person assuming that principle governed the situation or persons involved. If not dismiss the principle as erroneous or at least deeply suspicious. For example, suppose someone proposes that things-as-they-appear-to-be are not things-as-they-really-are. I do not think I would buy a used car from this man.

thomasreid
Thomas Reid (1710 – 1796)
Reid goes on to list a number of principles that he holds to be contingently true (but not necessarily true all the time) (Reid 1785b)

1) Everything of which I am conscious really exists
2) The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person.
3) Events that I clearly remember really did happen.
4) Our personal identity and continued existence extends as far back in time as we remember anything clearly.
5) Those things that we clearly perceive by our senses really exist and really are what we perceive them to be.
6) We have some power over our actions and over the decisions of our will.
7) The natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not deceptive.
8) There is life and thought in our fellow-men with whom we converse.
9) Certain features of the face, tones of voice, and physical gestures indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind.
10) A certain respect should be accorded to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion.
11) For many outcomes that will depend on the will of man, there is a self-evident probability, greater or less according to circumstances.
12) In the phenomena of Nature, what happens will probably be like what has happened in similar circumstances.

According to Reid, anyone who doubts these principles will be incapable of rational discourse and those philosophers who profess to doubt them cannot do so sincerely and consistently. Each of these principles, if denied, can be turned back on the denier. For example, although it is not possible to justify the validity of memory (3) without reference to premises that rest on memory, to dispense with memory as usually unreliable is just not philosophically possible. Reid qualifies some of these principles as not applying in all cases, or as the assumptions that we presume to hold when we converse, which may be contradicted by subsequent experience. For instance with regard to (10) Reid believes that most men are more apt to over-rate testimony and authority than to under-rate them; which suggests to Reid that this principle retains some force even when it could be replaced by reasoning.

I endorse Reid’s principles as normally true and what we must assume to be true to engage in argument and discussion. But, as Reid acknowledges, not all may be true all the time. I thus see Reid’s principles as epistemological rather than metaphysical. Psychologists might point to such things as optical illusions, false memory, attentional blink, hallucinations and various other interesting phenomena which might throw some doubt over some of Reid’s assertions. But these are nonessential modifiers that if entertained as falsifications of these principles would lead to the collapse of all knowledge. Very few philosophers have not acknowledged that the senses can deceive us or that reason is fallible, but to say the senses consistently deceive or that reason is impotent is too big a sacrifice. That the senses can deceive and reason is fallible is good reason to be cautious in our conclusions but not a good reason to dispense with observation and reason all together. Whereas it may be true that

“we are the sort of creatures who cannot help but believe some things that are false,” and “There seems to be no guarantee that our epistemic capacities really give us access to the world,” (Jamieson 1991)

it does not follow that everything we believe is false, nor that our most cherished beliefs – 1 to 12 above – are entirely false.

References

Barrow J (1988) The World within the World, Oxford University Press, p54
Jamieson D (1991) Method and Moral Theory in Singer P (ed) A Companion to Ethics Blackwell p 476-487
Kant I (1783) Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics transl J Fieser p6 available at http://www.forgottenbooks.org
Moore GE (1925) A Defence of Common Sense in Muirhead JH (ed) Contemporary British Philosophy (2nd series), available at http://www.ditext.com/moore/common-sense.html.
Popper K (1983) Realism and the Aim of Science Routledge p131
Reid T (1785a) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay 6 Chapter 2 available at http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfbig/reidibig.pdf (p217)
Reid T (1785b) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay 6 Chapter 5 ibid p240-51
Wolpert L (1992) The Unnatural Nature of Science Faber & Faber pp xi,11,12,16,106,487

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The Self: The greatest trick your mind never played

by Michael Davidson

The 23 February 2013 special issue of the New Scientist featured a series of short articles entitled “The Self: the greatest trick your mind ever played“. These provide various arguments as to why ‘the self’ – ie ‘you’ – is deluded into thinking it exists when in fact it doesn’t.the self

The first thing to note is that of the seven small articles, two are by the philosopher Jan Westerhoff and three are written or partially written by “New Scientist consultants”. Two other authors are named but their credentials are undisclosed. I will only comment here on Westerhoff’s articles.

Westerhoff briefly reviews some of the philosophical arguments that tell us that ‘the self’ is an illusion. Either ‘the self’ is like
1) a continuous thread which “runs through every single moment of our lives, providing a core and a unity for them.” or
2) it is just “the continuity of overlapping mental events” – somewhat like a rope which has no single fibre running the length of the rope but still holds together as a rope.

The argument against the first model is that what we normally consider to be ‘the self’ undergoes numerous changes through our lives – such as “being happy or sad, being able to speak Chinese, preferring cherries to strawberries, even being conscious.” The continuous self, then, is “so far removed from everything constituting us that its absence would scarcely be noticeable.”

The argument against the rope model is that there is no constant part therein that we can identify with.

Since these two models are flawed we are urged to conclude that a continuing ‘self’ is really an illusion. The simpler course is to think of better models. The fact that our moods, tastes, abilities etc change through our lives does not seem to be a great strike against a simple entity – attribute – ability model. The puzzle – if it be a puzzle – of how an entity can change its attributes and remain the same entity has come down to us from the ancient Greeks as the paradox of the ‘Ship of Theseus’. The idea is that as the various planks that make up the ship are replaced because of decay, it is possible eventually that no part of the original ship remains. Is it then the same ship? Such paradoxes are thus not confined to ‘the self’.

Westerhoff states that even if there is no continuing self perhaps there is a self in the here and now – ie the self is where all the senses come together.

But this apparency of the unity of conscious experience can be disrupted as seen in an experiment which is described but not referenced. This experiment was first reported by Kolers & von Gruneau (1). In it two coloured dots (one red, one green) are displayed on a screen in quick succession in different locations. According to the article the dot appears to move steadily between the two locations and change colour somewhere between. This immediately presents a paradox, since the apparent spot cannot change colour before it arrives at the second location. The apparency of motion caused by a succession of closely related images is called the ‘beta phenomenon’ and is the fortunate basis of the multi-billion dollar movie industry.

The colour changing illusion is not seen by everyone. I personally do not see it and psychologist Nelson Cowan (2) reports that he sees the moving object as colourless.

But this experiment is apparently seen of great significance in destroying the idea that ‘the self’ is the confluence of the senses whereby we get a whole view of the world – what Aristotle termed ‘the common sense’. There are innumerable other optical illusions which show that our perceptions are modulated by our sensory apparatus but these don’t evidently have the same significance. It is no surprise that the senses can be deceived by sufficiently unusual and specifically engineered events but this does not mean that our perceptions are always wrong. Indeed if they were not usually good enough we would have no criteria for determining when they deceive and human beings would have been winnowed by natural selection millennia ago. We usually can recognise illusions as illusions.

A third aspect of ‘the self’ which needs to be explained (away) is the apparency of conscious will, ie that we are agents – “the thinker of our thoughts and the doer of our deeds.” The empirical finding on which this argument relies is an experiment by Wegner & Wheatley in 1999 (3). Approx 50 volunteers were asked to move a cursor around a screen by controlling a mouse and stop the cursor on one of about 50 small images. The mouse was shared with an accomplice of the experimenters via an ouija board arrangement, and unbeknownst to the volunteer the accomplice was instructed to force a stop on particular objects at particular times. The volunteers were asked to stop on the same particular objects and then to rate how much they were actually involved in causing the stop (between 0% = ‘I allowed the stop to happen’ to 100% = ‘I intended to make the stop’). What was variable was the interval of time from the forced stop and the moment when the object was named to the volunteer. When the object name was presented between 1 and 5 seconds before the stop, the volunteers rated their intentions at 60%+-5% as opposed to when the word was presented 30 secs before or 1 sec afterwards (45% +-5%). The result is significant at the 5% level, though 45% and 60% indicates the participants weren’t particularly certain either way. The Westerhoff article however gives no hint of this uncertainty, implying a much more definite result than is in fact the case.

Wegner & Wheatley concluded that conscious will is only an apparency – similar to magic in that the magician presents an apparent causal sequence whilst the real sequence is something else. People do what they do not through conscious will but as the result of various genetic, unconscious, neural, cognitive, emotional, social and possibly other causes. This (according to Wegner & Wheatley) is the ‘core assumption‘ of psychological science. Evidently the conclusion follows from the assumption rather than the empirical facts.

The conditions of the experiment are such that the volunteer thinks that the experimenter’s accomplices are volunteers like himself. It is not known how he views the other person: as a competitor, a team player, a spectator etc. The times where the accomplice did not manage to force the stop on the particular object chosen at the desired time (which seemed to be between 22% and 47% for any one participant) were excluded from the analysis. So there are a number of question marks as to what this experiment means. The philosopher Eddy Nahmias (4) comments “When all is said and done, Wegner has offered no evidence or arguments against this proposal: certain brain processes have the property of being consciously represented to the agent as mental states we describe as beliefs, desires, intentions and actions (for instance, my brain is currently going through the processes which I experience as something like ‘I think this proposal makes sense’. Type out the words, ‘This proposal makes sense.’ and so on). How is it that these brain processes have these experiential properties is currently a mystery… But if these processes did not have their representational properties then they would not have the causal powers they have.” I comment further in chapter 12 of my e-book “Rethinking the Mind”.

In a separate article “When are you? – you are being tricked into thinking you live in the present” Westerhoff describes an experiment by Eagleman & Sejnowski (5). Five participants sat in front of a computer screen on which a small ring moved around a large circle at one revolution per second. When the ring was in a certain position of its trajectory (9 o’clock) a white disk was flashed at the 9’oclock position +- 7° and the subjects were asked to indicate whether the flash was above or below the ring when it was perceived. In this way an estimate of how much the flash was displaced from the perceived position of the ring at the time of the flash could be made. Each participant saw the flash when the ring was displaced by around 5°. When the direction of travel of the ring was reversed at the time of the flash the percept was displaced by a similar amount in the new direction of travel. By changing the time at which the reversal takes place upto 80 millisecs after the flash the perceived position of the flash can be manipulated. This indicates that “the percept attributed to the time of the flash is a function of the events that happen in the ~80 millisecs after the flash.”

According to Westerhoff “All this is slightly worrying if we hold on to the common-sense view that our selves are placed in the present. If the moment of time we are supposed to be inhabiting turns out to be a mere construction, the same is likely to be true of the self existing in that present.” This seems to be a drastic conclusion for the sake of 80 millisecs. High class athletes find it difficult to react to the starting gun in less than 180 millsecs but athletes are not considered to be zombies as a result. Similarly the apparent fact that our present moment is stretched over 80 millisecs does not entail that there is no ‘self’.

The whole approach seems to be an example of what Francis Bacon (1561-1626) identified as the human habit of accepting data that agrees with one’s own prejudices or those of the philosophical schools and rejecting data that disagrees. This was demonstrated in an experiment (6) in which 24 proponents and 24 opponents of capital punishment were shown the results of two studies that showed evidence for and against capital punishment as a deterrent.   Since the studies were fictional (unbeknownst to the 48 students) they could be ‘engineered’ to produce positive or negative findings from exactly equivalent protocols, and could be presented in either order to eliminate the effects of sequence.   Needless to say, the subjects felt that the studies confirming their view were more scientifically valid than those opposing.   Furthermore they were more convinced that their view was correct after reviewing both pieces of evidence than before, regardless of the order in which the two studies were viewed (p < 0.001).

This series of short articles in the New Scientist hold to a materialist philosophy as the starting point. Since materialist notions fail to find any reason why there should be a ‘self’ then the ‘self’ must be denied as an illusion or delusion. All forms of materialism have philosophical difficulties, as do all forms of non-materialism, such as dualism. What is required is a neutral approach that takes the empirical data and forms theories of limited applicability and from there predict and control phenomena in that area to gradually widen the theories.

Assuming the answer to the mind-body problem in advance (materialism) and limiting the search to only the empirical data that seems to confirm this philosophical view is not only self-confirming but anti-science.

References

1. Kolers PA & von Gruneau M (1976) Shaper and Colour in Apparent Motion Vision Research vol 16 p 329-335.

2. Cowan N (1995) Attention and Memory an Integrated Framework OUP p237

3. Wegner D & Wheatley T (1999) Apparent Mental Causation Source of the experience of Will American Psychologist vol 54 no 7 p 480-492 available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~wegner/pdfs/Wegner&Wheatley1999.pdf

4. Nahmias E(2002) When Consciousness matters Philosophical Psychology vol 15(4) p527-554

5. Eagleman DM & Sejnowski TJ (2000) Motion Integration and Postdiction in Visual Awareness Science vol 287 p2036

6. Lord CG, Ross L & Lepper MR (1979) Biased assimilation and attitude polarisation: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence Journal of Personality & Social Psychology vol 37 p2098-2109 available at http://synapse.princeton.edu/~sam/lord_ross_lepper79_JPSP_biased-assimilation-and-attitude-polarization.pdf

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Can we really trust Scientists?

by Michael Davidson

Let us assume for the sake of argument that there is a subject or activity known as ‘science’.   Not just a bunch of separate activities grouped together because of a certain ‘family resemblance’.   What supposedly makes ‘science’ special is the ‘scientific method’.   This guarantees that the findings of ‘science’ are true.

The Royal Society  is one of the premier scientific societies in the world.   It was founded in 1660 with the motto “Nullius in verba” – “take nobody’s word for it”.   The original members credited Francis Bacon (1561-1626) with the inspiration to found their society.

Bacon’s idea of the scientific method was to proceed from repeated observations to general principles.   This process is called ‘induction’.   Induction is defined as the process whereby a premise of the form “All observed A’s are B” leads to a conclusion of the form “All A’s are B”.     Over time we can induce more and more general laws of nature.   From these laws we can then predict new facts and find out if they are true by experimental test.

Isaac Newton (1642-1727) claimed to have arrived at his laws of motion and gravitation  from the empirical observations made by  Kepler and Galileo (and his own experiments).

Unfortunately the philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) later showed that the idea of induction is flawed.   No finite number of observations such as
“this object near the surface of the earth falls with acceleration g”
can guarantee that
“all objects near the surface of the earth fall with acceleration g“.   Aristotle (483-322BC) would have said: “some does not prove all” and would have pointed at fire and smoke which rise.

In view of this logical difficulty with induction, we can divide scientific method into two separate parts.:
a) how to get from observations to principles – the problem of discovery, and
b) how to justify the principles arrived at – the problem of justification.

The second part is relatively easy.   Once we have a principle we can point to all the observational and experimental evidence that is consistent with the principle.   But how we create theories is often considered a personal subjective process which logic does not illuminate.

William Whewell (1794-1866) coined the term ‘scientist’ in 1834.   He maintained that ‘scientists’ do not proceed by induction but
“Success seems to consist in framing several tentative hypotheses and selecting the right one.”[1]
Observation and experiment are thus directed by the various alternative hypotheses, rather than being collected in some kind of magpie fashion as Bacon seemed to suggest.

A key step is the isolation and clarification of a concept:
“Scientific induction is always guided by a concept which proves its worth by binding facts together in such a way to enable us to see significant generalisations that had previously escaped us.”

Science thus depends on the creative process of forming concepts and hypotheses.   Since ‘scientists’ are human beings, their prejudices can skew the discovery of hypotheses.   Francis Bacon had already recognised and classified several such prejudices:
accepting data that agrees with one’s own ideas and dismissing data that does not;
jumping to conclusions too hastily;
the use of vague words;
clinging to fashionable ideas rather than subjecting them to test.

A 1979 experiment demonstrates the first prejudice.  24 proponents and 24 opponents of capital punishment were shown the results of two studies that showed evidence for and against capital punishment as a deterrent.

The studies were fictional (unbeknownst to the 48 students).   They were ‘engineered’ to produce positive or negative findings from exactly the same ‘evidence’.

Needless to say, the students felt that the studies confirming their view were more scientifically valid than those opposing.   Furthermore they were more convinced than before that their view was correct after reviewing both pieces of evidence .   This was regardless of the order in which they saw the two studies.[2]

There are well established concepts and principles in the sciences such as ‘the conservation of energy’ in physics, the ‘evolution of species’ in biology, the periodic table of the elements in chemistry, ‘uniformitarianism’ in geology and much much more besides.

But when we get to the forefront of research in any area of science there is great controversy.      The status of
‘string theory’ in physics[3];
sociobiology in biology [4];
morality in neuroscience (or vice versa) [5];
‘artificial intelligence’ in computer ‘science’[6]
and many others are topics of hot debate.
The story you get depends on which side of the debate the story teller sits.

The pronouncements of famous scientists on topics outside their sphere and much of what passes for ‘science’ in the press is more properly described as scientism.   Scientism is an exaggeration of the efficacy of science, the claim that the only knowledge is ‘scientific’ knowledge.

The only genuine claims according to this view are those that can be confirmed by the ‘scientific method’, though how this claim can be confirmed by the scientific method is not explained.   This claim gives rise to an exaggerated belief that we understand more about the world than we actually do.   Since the only knowledge is scientific, on this view, science tells us about the way the world really is (ie metaphysics).

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy which deals with the ultimate nature of reality: “what kinds of things exist?” and “what is their nature?”   Metaphysics should be confined to inductive hypotheses from the various sciences and be described as metaphysical rather than ‘scientific’.

Scientists tend to see the world as explained by their particular science. Thus physicists see the world as entirely described by physics.   Neuroscientists see the world in terms of our brains.    Biologists see the world in terms of our evolutionary history.   And so on.   We only need to study one subject x to find that “all is x”.     “All is x” is metaphysics.

The difference between scientific and metaphysical hypotheses according to the modern philosopher Robert Almeder is that scientific hypotheses are “explicitly empirically testable”. It is possible to state detailed test conditions which would confirm or deny the hypothesis.

But philosophical hypotheses are only “implicitly empirically testable”. That is,  there might be some available data which would confirm or deny the hypothesis but nobody is currently able to specify what those data might be or how to get them.[7]

Thus if there is no conceivable way we can prove a ‘scientific’ claim then the claim is metaphysical not scientific.

Extrapolating from scientific evidence to metaphysical world views is not wrong provided we label it as ‘metaphysical’ rather than ‘scientific fact’.

Thus we have such ‘scientific facts’ as
‘mind is brain’[8],
‘there is no such thing as free will’[9],
‘concepts are nonsense.’[10]
These are aspects of the fashionable philosophical theory called ‘materialism’.

Materialism is not an essential feature of a science.   Some ‘scientists’ classify any endeavour that questions materialism  as ‘pseudo-science’.  They brand as taboo any investigation into the efficacy of such things as ‘alternative medicine’, parapsychology, spiritualism, etc.

George Orwell (1903-1950) in his celebrated essay on literary style, dated 1945[11], classified ‘science’ as a meaningless word because it has had several meanings and has been used “more or less dishonestly”.

The intervening half century or so has not crystallised the meaning at all.   The words ‘scientific’ and ‘scientist’ have  been hijacked by so many that they are now almost devoid of meaning.   They add only some kind of mystique to whatever pronouncement follows.

I am not ‘anti-science’.      I  believe in the power of the human imagination to frame hypotheses, to make tentative inductions, to predict effects and make experimental tests.   This leads us to theories whereby we can make broad predictions and control our environments through technology.   My beef is with the prevalence of sweeping ‘scientific’ pronouncements without adequate evidence.

Thus the answer to my question “Can we really trust scientists?” is  ‘sometimes’.   Here are a few criteria:

Is the scientist
a) speaking in his or her area of expertise?
b) not generalising into the realm of metaphysics?
c) steering clear of controversies within the field – or at least makes clear his or her position on such?
d) reviewing the evidence for his or her thesis?
e) speaking  in ordinary language?
f) proposing or endorsing something that is ethical?
If so there is a good chance you can trust him or her with the information.

These are criteria that do not just apply to scientists.
There are no special considerations for scientists. The physicist Richard Feynman said it more succinctly: “Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts.”[12]

An interesting and relevant blog about the misuse of statistics is http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-01/six-ways-to-separate-lies-from-statistics.html

 

References

  1. Whewell W  (1841,1996) The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences vol 2 Routledge  p467
  2. Lord CG, Ross L & Lepper MR  (1979) Biased assimilation and attitude polarisation: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence Journal of Personality & Social Psychology vol 37 p2098-2109 available at
    http://synapse.princeton.edu/~sam/lord_ross_lepper79_JPSP_biased-assimilation-and-attitude-polarization.pdf
  3. Smolin L  (2006) The Trouble With Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next Houghton Miflin, Boston
  4. U Segerstrale  (2000) Defenders of the Truth: The Battle for Science in the socio-biology debate and beyond Oxford University Press
  5. Horgan J  (2010) Be wary of the righteous rationalist: We should reject Sam Harris’s claim that science can be a moral guidepost Scientific American 11 Oct 2010   available at
    http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/2010/10/11/
  6. Searle J (1980) Minds Brains and Programs Behavioural and Brain Sciences 3 p417
  7. Almeder R (1998) Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy Open Court p166
  8. Dennett D (1991) Consciousness Explained Allen Lane p33
  9. Blakemore C  (1988) The Mind Machine BBC Books p7
  10. Watson JB  (1920) Is Thinking merely the Action Of Language Mechanisms?British Journal of Psychology, 11, 87-104.   available at
    http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Watson/thinking.htm
  11. Orwell G (1945) Politics and the English Language Penguin
  12. Feynman R (1969) What is Science? The Physics Teacher Vol. 7, issue 6

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The Woman who changed her Brain

by Michael Davidson

Book Review
(first published in Journal of Scientific Exploration 2012 vol 26 no 3
subsequently published in EdgeScience no 12 www.edgescience.org)

The Woman who Changed her Brain: Unlocking the Extraordinary Potential of the Human Mind by Barbara Arrowsmith-Young. Square Peg, London 2012.ISBN 978-0-2240-9518-1 & Free Press New York 2012 ISBN 978-1-4516-0793-2. 268pp incl index. also available as a Kindle e-book ISBN 978-1-4516-0795-6.

This book describes the difficulties experienced by Barbara Arrowsmith-Young of growing up with severe learning difficulties; the means whereby she found the techniques, not to live with those difficulties, but to actually address and resolve them; and how she has brought those techniques to children and adults through her 35 Arrowsmith Schools now established in various parts of Canada and the US.

Barbara grew up in Peterborough, Ontario, where for the first 26 years of her life, she “lived in a fog”. She could make no sense of the relationship between the hour and minute hands of a clock, so could not tell the time. She could not add or subtract double digit numbers; had difficulty reading; got the wrong words for common objects; could not tell the difference between the right and left hands; was accident prone; kept getting lost and could not tie her shoelaces.

Barbara could however remember (parrot) accurately the 9:00 o’clock news and was evidently gifted with a remarkable memory and sense of determination. These abilities got her through school and university. The change came in graduate school when she happened across Alexander Luria’s 1972 classic The Man with the Shattered World: The History of a Brain Wound which described the cognitive deficits of a brain injured soldier from WWII. Barbara identified with the soldier among whose difficulties was the inability to tell the time following his brain injury. Around the same time she came across some work by Mark Rosenzweig (1968) which demonstrated that the brains of rats could physically change in response to stimulation. If it was possible for rat brains to change then maybe it was possible for human brains to change also.

She created flash cards with pictures of clocks and studied every day for up to twelve hours each day, gradually making the tasks more complex (like adding second hands and day hands) and demanding faster response. She does not say how long she worked at this but it appears to have been several months. Eventually the fog cleared, she not only could tell the time but points of logic, grammar and maths now made sense. Now she could suddenly understand, not merely parrot, the TV news programs.

Not all her difficulties were resolved by the clock exercises so she developed new cognitive exercises to address each difficulty in turn based on knowledge of the functional anatomy of the brain. These exercises are now routinely used in the Arrowsmith program.

Since individual parts of the brain are involved in multiple activities, a defect in one part may have multiple consequences. Therefore the first step is to isolate which part is causing the manifest difficulty through psychological testing. These component cognitive deficits are described on the Arrowsmith website and in the book. There is sufficient detail that it would be possible to isolate which of the 19 brain functions isolated is in deficit for a relative or acquaintance, though probably not as accurately as with the formal tests.

For example, the facility for “motor symbolic sequencing” is involved in reading, writing and speaking. People with impairments to this facility often misread texts, their handwriting is poor and copying text is slow and inaccurate. Spelling of the same word can vary from instance to instance. They often make apparently arithmetical errors but in reality they are making motor errors due to thinking the right answer but writing another. In severe cases they may have difficulty communicating ideas because they ramble and leave out much information, making it difficult for others to follow.

There are some hints also of the kind of exercises that could resolve the various difficulties but clearly attendance at one of the Arrowsmith schools is advised.

One of the exercises for the above symbolic sequencing deficit is to trace Chinese (or other foreign) characters with the right (dominant) hand whilst wearing an eye patch over the left eye. The idea is to stimulate the left supplementary motor area responsible for the hand-eye coordination. The several motor symbolic sequencing disabilities mentioned above tend to resolve without being directly addressed.

The exercises are arranged in sequence to gradiently address the difficulty. The tasks must be neither too easy nor too hard so that the student has to, and is able to, make a conscious effort to engage with the task. Once the difficulty is resolved the change is permanent.

The average student is usually enrolled for 3 to 4 years but progress is maintained through the period so if a student is unable to complete the three to four year program, they nevertheless benefit for every year they are in the program. In one study (Lancee 2005) of 79 students aged between 5 and 19 (average 11) who were assessed on 15 standard educational attainment tests for reading, writing, comprehension and arithmetic, 29 had between 1 and 7 scores below the 25th percentile, the lower end of the normal range. These students were considered to have the least severe learning difficulties. The average attainment in this group was at the 15th percentile at entry but after one year the average was at the 41st percentile. Even the 10 most severely affected students at intake (all 15 test scores below the 25th percentile) with average attainment at the 5th percentile had average attainment at the 25th percentile after 3 years. Age, gender and IQ do not evidently affect the rate of progress significantly.

It must be stressed that these cognitive exercises are not the same kind of thing as the computerized “brain training exercises” that are the current fad and evidently form the basis of a multi-million dollar industry. A six week study (Owen et al 2010) of 11,430 participants who ‘brain trained’ several times each week showed that there was no evidence that the training led to any improvement in untrained tasks or any general improvement in cognitive functioning. Improvement was observed on the specific tasks trained only. Evidence that some exercises aimed at ‘surface abilities’ over a six week period are ineffective is not evidence that some exercises aimed at specific ‘atomic abilities’ for several hours per day over several months to several years are not effective.

Cognitive learning difficulties can lead for those affected to social isolation and exploitation thus compounding the difficulties. Emotional and arousal problems that may arise through this mechanism are not addressed by the Arrowsmith program. Of course emotional and arousal problems can occur through psycho-social mechanisms in those not affected by learning difficulties. A wholly different approach to these appears to be needed.

What is interesting about the efficacy of these cognitive exercises is what they say about the philosophy of mind. Since they are based on an understanding of the correlations between brain anatomy and brain function they may seem to give physicalists no cause for concern and even vindication of their ‘mind is brain’ stance. But as we are constantly reminded ‘correlation does not prove causation’. The puzzle in philosophy of mind is how physical processes can give rise to consciousness. There have been numerous ‘solutions’ to this puzzle, including the idea that consciousness has no causative powers and influences the workings of the body (and brain) with the same power as “the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine … without influence upon its machinery.”(Huxley 1912) This stance known as ‘epiphenomenalism’ is commonly held in some philosophical (Pauen, Staudaker & Walter 2006), neuroscientific (Soon et al 2008) and psychological (Wenger & Wheatley 1999) circles. It is flatly contradicted by the fact that the Arrowsmith exercises are done with conscious effort. It may not be psychokinesis but the evidence is that the brain is changed by the continued effort of a conscious mind. At least that is the simplest and most direct explanation.

The Arrowsmith program deserves to become known and applied world wide. I hope the organisation Barbara Arrowsmith-Young has put together will be able to cope with the demand and the inevitable criticism and conflict that will follow.

References
Arrowsmith website: http://www.arrowsmithschool.org/arrowsmithprogram/index.html
accessed 2012/06/14

Huxley TH (1912) Method and Results Macmillan : p240 available at http://www.archive.org/details/methodresultsess00huxluoft accessed 2012/06/14

Lancee WJ (2005) Report of an Outcome Evaluation of the Arrowsmith Program for Treating Learning Disabled Students (available on the Arrowsmith website )

Owen AM, Hampshire A, Grahn JA, Stenton R, Dajani S, Burns AS, Howard RJ & Ballard CG (2010) Putting brain training to the test Nature vol 465 (7299) p775–778 available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v465/n7299/full/nature09042.html accessed 2012/06/14

Pauen M, Staudacher A & Walter S (eds) (2006) Journal of Consciousness Studies vol 13 no 1-2

Rosenzweig MR, Love W & Bennett EL (1968) Effects of a Few Hours a Day of Enriched Experience on Brain Chemistry and Brain Weights Physiology & Behaviour vol 3 p819-825

Soon CS, Brass M, Heinze H-J & Haynes J-D (2008) Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience vol 11, p543-545

Wegner D & T Wheatley T (1999) Apparent Mental Causation Source of the Experience of Will American Psychologist vol 54 no 7 p480-492 available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~wegner/pdfs/Wegner&Wheatley1999.pdf

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The Logical Leap

by Michael Davidson

Book Review
(first published in Journal of Scientific Exploration 2011 vol 25 no 4)

The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics by David Harriman. New York: New American Library, 2010. 275pp, incl index. $16.00 (paperback) ISBN 978-0-451-23005-8

The so-called problem of induction has been with us since David Hume first drew attention to it in the mid 18th century. The problem is that we infer from a number of similar events laws of nature that are universal. We infer the idea of a cue ‘causing’ a billiard ball to move, by observation of many similar events of cues striking billiard balls. Therefore we suppose that the next time we strike a billiard ball with a cue that the ball will move in a similar way. But, says Hume, there is no valid chain of reasoning that can lead to that conclusion (there is no valid Aristotelian syllogism that leads from ‘some’ to ‘all’). We can introduce an axiom “the future resembles the past” or “nature is uniform in certain regards”, but by so doing we are arguing in a circle:

“all inferences from experience suppose . . . that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible therefore that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance” (Hume 1748).

This problem of being unable to get from past observations to some necessarily true
general principle is known as the “problem of induction”.

Induction is contrasted with deduction, which is moving from some true premises inevitably to true conclusions. Aristotle formulated the laws of logic which showed which kind of deductions (syllogisms) lead to correct conclusions, regardless of the actual objects to which the various premises refer. The ubiquitous example is “All A’s are B; C is A; Therefore C is B.” Thus “All men are mortal; Socrates is a Man; Therefore Socrates is mortal.” The point is that the deduction is valid whatever is substituted for A, B and C. The deduction is not necessarily true if the premises are not true: “All men are women; Socrates is a man; Therefore Socrates is a woman”. There is thus a distinction in Aristotelian logic between the validity of an argument and the truth of the conclusion. Aristotle came to his universal laws of logic by a process of induction. First he examined a great many arguments and arranged them into 192 possible forms, removing the particulars to which the arguments referred. Aristotle then isolated 14 valid syllogisms out of the 192 (later expanded to 19 out of 256) which give true conclusions if the premises are true. Although a syllogism may be valid and true it does not necessarily get you very far. Take for example the valid syllogism “no women are immortal; some people are women; therefore some people are mortal.” All the valid syllogisms have “all” or “no” in one or the other of the premises. But the only way such premises can be arrived at is by induction or by definition (as in mathematics).

Yet science proceeds from individual experiments and observations to general principles. It is to the problem of when and why the inference from ‘some’ to ‘all’ is legitimate; “in short, how can man determine which generalizations are true (correspond to reality) and which ones false (contradict reality)”; (p 7) that Harriman sets his mind in “The Logical Leap” subtitled “Induction in Physics”.

To answer the question Harriman relies on the Objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand (1905-1982, author of the novel “Atlas Shrugged”, where she describes her philosophy in detail, other works of fiction and numerous philosophical essays). This takes for granted the validity of sense perception and causality (p9). Sense perception is our only contact with reality. From sense perception we find out what exists in the world: tables, chairs etc. “We form concepts by grasping similarities that make a group of existents stand out against a background of different existents.” (p10). The concepts formed in this way do not imply that all existents grouped into a concept are the same: their differences are quantitative. For instance, tables have different surface areas, different heights and different numbers of legs. “When we form a concept, our mental process consists in retaining the characteristics but omitting their differing measurements.”(p10)

Concepts are hierarchical. “The meaning of first-level concepts can be made clear simply by pointing to instances.” (p12) For higher level concepts we need definitions which must be empirical statements that specify the distinguishing characteristics and condense our knowledge of them. A concept however cannot be equated with its definition:

“The concept ‘temperature’ had the same meaning for Galileo and Einstein ie both men referred to the same physical property. The difference is only that Einstein knew much more about this property; he understood its relation to heat, to motion, and to the fundamental nature of matter.”(p13)

Generalizations are also hierarchical, and all generalizations ultimately depend on first level generalizations: “all generalizations – first level and higher – are statements of causal connection… there is nothing to make any generalization true except some form of causal relationship.” (p21). Thus, contrary to Hume, we perceive causation directly in the case of the cue and the billiard ball, and in the case of high level generalizations we discover causes by experiment. We do not discover causes by simply counting regularities or finding correlations.

The above is a (condensed) version of Rand’s theory of concepts. The so-called problem of induction relies on prior concepts. “Deduction takes for granted the process of conceptualization. Induction is the conceptualizing process itself in action.” (p35) The process of making higher level concepts requires thought and is therefore not infallible. In fact it is quite difficult.

As an example of correct induction, Harriman cites Benjamin Franklin’s famous experiment with a kite in a thunderstorm which showed that lightening is essentially electricity. Franklin drew on a number of concepts:

“‘electricity’, ‘discharge’, ‘conductor’, ‘insulator’, ‘Leyden jar’. These concepts were made possible by and represent a wealth of earlier knowledge (which was also discovered by means of experiment). Without this conceptual framework, as we may call it, Franklin could only have stared uncomprehendingly at sparks and shocks. Given such a framework, however, he can at once identify what he is seeing: the kite apparatus is a long conductor, and thus the electrically charged thundercloud causes [the Leyden jar to become charged]. Once Franklin can identify what he is seeing in such terms, his conclusion – the generalization – follows directly.”.(p32)

Harriman then discusses at length the progress of scientific knowledge in astronomy, physics and chemistry by the ‘greats’ such as Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Lavoisier, Dalton, Maxwell and Mendeleev and brings out the mechanics of valid induction, though the accounts might be construed as rather Whiggish, wherein the later theory is accepted as correct, the good guys are the ones who got the answer right and the bad guys are the ones who tried to resist the right answer.

From this survey Harriman shows when induction is valid and delineates several fallacies which make induction appear invalid:
a) Dropped context: To say Newton’s laws are falsified by the development of relativity and quantum mechanics is to drop the context. They are true in the context of the mechanics of ordinary bodies and the motion of planets, in which context the laws were validly induced. (p8)
b) Substituting a regularity for a cause: Lavoisier thought that the presence of oxygen in a chemical compound was what made the chemical acidic. This was merely a regularity in those acids he studied and was not found in hydrochloric acid (then known as muriatic acid).(p196)
c) Inadequate experimental controls: Galvani thought that the reason a frog’s leg placed on a silver plate jerks when touched by a bronze hook was because electricity was stored in the leg. Volta thought the reason was contact of the different metals and the frog was irrelevant for the production of electricity. Galvani and Volta both performed variations of the experiment which ‘proved’ their point. Davy later showed that the frog’s leg provided a salt solution vital for the operation of the silver-bronze battery. (p200)
d) ‘Cognitive fixation’: The physicist Lord Kelvin ‘refuted’ the up-and-coming science of geology on the grounds that the age of the Earth, according to the then known physics, was too young for the formation of mountains as postulated by the geologists. Kelvin could not see that the facts of geology suggested another energy source apart from gravity on which he based his calculations. (p206)
e) ‘Cognitive promiscuity’: Pons & Fleischman proclaimed they had been able to obtain the ‘cold fusion’ of deuterium atoms in a room temperature electrolysis experiment, “despite weak evidence and a context that makes the idea implausible… A mind that is open to any ‘possibility’, regardless of its relation to the total context of knowledge, is a mind detached from reality and therefore closed to knowledge.” (p207)
f) ‘Theory stealing’: accepting a theory as an instrument for research whilst not believing that the theory refers to reality. This was the situation through much of the 19th century when many chemists did not believe that atoms actually exist, whilst still using the theory to guide their research. (p220)

In the final chapter, Harriman turns his attention to quantum theory.

“As a mathematical formalism, quantum theory has been enormously successful. It makes quantitative predictions of impressive accuracy for a vast range of phenomena, providing the basis for modern chemistry, condensed matter physics, nuclear physics and optics. It also made possible some of the greatest technological innovations of the twentieth century, including computers and lasers. Yet as a fundamental theory of physics it is strangely empty… It gives a mathematical recipe for predicting the statistical behavior of particles but fails to provide causal models of subatomic processes.” (p248)

According to Harriman, the necessity of supposing that a single reality exists, that the human mind has a reasonably clear access to it, and that the scientist can explain it, has been surrendered not by reference to experimental facts (“the knowledge gained by experimental discovery of facts can never lead to the denial of knowledge and fact.”) but by the influence of post-Kantian philosophy,

“an enemy that operated behind the front lines and provided the corrupt framework used to misinterpret facts. By rejecting causality and accepting the unintelligibility of the atomic world, physicists have reduced themselves to mere calculating machines (at best) – and thus they are unable to ask further questions or to integrate their knowledge.”

Harriman does not discuss the double-slit experiment, the EPR experiments of Alain Aspect and others, the quantum Zeno effect, quantum computation and the various other puzzling phenomena in quantum physics. Harriman himself seems to be ‘theory stealing’ here in that he is willing to accept the benefits he lists from quantum theory without subscribing to the theory itself, nor addressing the really puzzling experimental facts on which the theory is based. There is no explanation of why quantum mechanics gives such precise answers whilst it does not correspond to reality.

I do not deny that modern physics is in something of a crisis. 96% of the universe as we know it consists of ‘dark matter’ and ‘dark energy’ which we have only the vaguest idea about. The two most successful theories we have: quantum mechanics and general relativity refer to completely different contexts and are deeply incompatible in those areas where perhaps they both apply (such as black holes). The effort to unify these two great theories has stimulated physicists to retreat into metaphysical speculation of great mathematical complexity (string theory) with as yet no hint of an experimental test.

In short, Harriman presents a reasonable theory of how a science can proceed by induction to true theories (provided you read ‘true’ as ‘true in context’ and not ‘absolute truth’). He shows, following Rand, that the problem of induction depends on prior concepts that had not been examined by Hume and that science is possible (contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of certain philosophers over the centuries). I am skeptical about his insistence that physics must conform to some pre-ordained form (which might be construed as ‘cognitive fixation’). As Neils Bohr said in response to Einstein’s insistence that “God does not play dice with the universe,”: “Do not tell God what to do.”

“Physics is the most universal of the natural sciences.” (p ix) and Harriman does not address the sciences such as biology, psychology, sociology which suffer from ‘physics envy’ but rely even more on statistics than quantum mechanics. It is here that his theory of induction might meet even tougher challenges.

Reference
Hume D (1748) “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding” Section IV part II.

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A science of Mind?

by Michael Davidson

Is it possible to have a science of mind?   Is science necessarily materialistic so that we can only ever have a science of brain?   To answer this we need to understand what science is.

The English philosopher and statesman Francis Bacon (1561-1626) is sometimes credited as the “father of modern science” for his philosophical work, the “Instauratio Magna” (Latin: instauratio = to reform, to repair or renew; magna = great , hence the Great Restoration) which was only partially completed.

Bacon roundly condemned his predecessors: they have laid “down the law of nature as a thing already searched out and understood, [and] have therein done philosophy and the sciences great injury. For as they have been successful in inducing belief, so they have been effective in quenching and stopping inquiry.”

Bacon saw that the way the human mind is constituted makes rational enquiry and experiment difficult. We have a propensity to generalise too hastily. We accept data that agrees with our own ideas and dismiss data that does not. We use words that are too vague in meaning. We accept the dogmas of the various schools of philosophy without subjecting them to test.

It is time to reassert Bacon’s project, to roll back the tide of scientism that declares what is and what is not acceptable science, what can and what cannot be published on the grounds that we now know the laws of nature. This ‘scientific’ view declares that people are material objects subject to the same laws as the rest of the universe which we now thoroughly understand.  Human beings are machines.  There is no such thing as ‘free will’, it is a delusion foisted on us by electrochemical processes in the brain. But in that case how is it that we seem to have free will? Who or what is this ‘us’ that harbours such a delusion? How do electro-chemical impulses in the brain provide us with this rich perceptual world? Are we really the effect of our genes and upbringing – robots programmed to react in certain ways? Or is it the case that we really are agents, able to actually cause events?

My e-book “Rethinking the Mind” considers the evidence from multiple perspectives including the philosophy of mind, the sciences of physics, biology and neurology and the technologies of computers and psychiatry. I conclude that much of the ‘common knowledge’ in these subjects which describes human beings as physical objects whose thoughts are mere by-products of brain processes determined by the laws of physics and chemistry, is actually metaphysics masquerading as science.

A more considered approach requires a better understanding of what we mean by the word ‘science’, and an empirical approach to the phenomena of mind without insisting that the evidence should fit into some preconceived scheme.

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